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Isolate or Engage, edited by Geoffrey Wiseman explores how the United 
States (US) conducts public diplomacy in adversarial states. An adversarial 
state is defined as a country “with which the United States maintains limited 
or no formal diplomatic relations because of mutual hostility…for extended 
periods” (p. 11). The book covers nine contemporary case studies: Soviet 
Union/ Russia, China, North Korea, Vietnam, Libya, Iran, Syria, Cuba, and 
Venezuela. The work, which is primarily composed of case studies, delves 
into how the US attempts to influence foreign publics when its diplomatic 
relations are limited, whether limiting diplomatic ties hamper US interests, 
and challenges and opportunities in public diplomacy when diplomatic 
relations are limited. The volume as a whole is skeptical of the isolationist 
foreign policy of the US, which jeopardises the country’s potential for 
public diplomacy “in a hyperconnected world…driven by popular trends 
and movements rather than by what governments do” (p. 4).
Most authors in this work employ a nontraditional understanding of 
diplomacy that includes non-state actors as well as governments as the 
public diplomacy actors. This book focuses on three kinds of US efforts in 
public diplomacy in adversarial countries. The first two of which warrant the 
question of whether they should even be regarded as public diplomacy: 
traditional government-to-government diplomacy in public using 
broadcasting, social media, or messengers as intermediaries (President 
Carter’s visits to North Korea, Chapter 3), which have been termed by 
Bruce Gregory (2014: 1) “diplomacy’s public dimension” rather than 
public diplomacy. The second is concerned with pure people-to-people 
exchanges that may not necessarily have intentional political agendas 
and hence should be treated at best as unintentional contributions to US 
public diplomacy efforts. Third, the focus turns to government-sponsored 
public diplomacy initiatives, which are the least common examples found 
in the book. 
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In the case studies, non-state efforts are emphasised more than state-
centric public diplomacy initiatives, particularly due to deep-rooted 
suspicions of the American government as well as the obvious difficulties 
of conducting official public diplomacy while diplomatic relations are 
limited. Indeed, almost every interaction that is not an official government-
to-government diplomatic communication is treated as public diplomacy 
in those chapters that are written by area experts who are not necessarily 
students of public diplomacy. The reason for this vague conceptual 
choice seems to be the understanding of traditional diplomacy as private 
(confidential) diplomacy, while public diplomacy is regarded as being 
almost everything else (see p. 292). The chapters on China (Chapter 2), 
Vietnam (Chapter 4) and Cuba (Chapter 8) in particular suggest that 
public diplomacy should be left to civil society, in line with Manuel Castells’ 
(2008: 91) idea that public diplomacy “is not government diplomacy,” but 
it “is the diplomacy of the public.”
Wiseman concludes that US has always been working to influence the 
publics of isolated countries. However, this has proven very difficult, as 
isolation restricts the use of the US’s official channels of public diplomacy. 
Often, individuals and non-state actors are more successful in facilitating 
exchanges with peoples in isolated countries. Pure people-to-people 
exchanges in such cases are free from governmental direction and 
most often lack a political agenda or intention. Therefore, they are not 
public diplomacy per se, but they may help “form the basis for future 
normalization of relations and improved ties” (p. 282). Furthermore, 
diasporas, individuals, and non-state actors are often helpful in catalysing 
relations and even mediating, but their interactions and messages 
cannot be fully controlled by the governments (pp. 283, 293). Wiseman 
recommends increasing the support of the US government for people-to-
people exchanges (p. 292), but if these “pure” exchanges based on an 
understanding of genuine dialogue and mutuality, are also considered to 
be proxies of US government, publics in adversarial states may become as 
suspicious of civilian initiatives as they are of official US initiatives.
The work in general takes a skeptical view of isolating foreign policies 
and makes the case that limited channels of official communication 
damage the US’s interests vis-à-vis isolated countries, not least by making 
it impossible to realise the full potential of public diplomacy in them. The 
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authors emphasise that it is important to intend to change the behaviour 
of adversarial states over the long run rather than employing isolating 
strategies that aim change regimes in adversarial states in the short run. 
However, another conclusion drawn in the book (particularly chapters 
on USSR/ Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran) reminds us that what the 
US can achieve in adversarial states through public diplomacy is limited, 
particularly when the nature of the problems is a matter of high politics, 
such as a nuclear standoff. 
Isolate or Engage makes three significant contributions to the study of 
public diplomacy. First, while many studies have failed to address the 
foreign policy aspect of public diplomacy, this book makes the connection, 
suggesting that public diplomacy must be integrated into the foreign policy 
of the US (p. 7). The underlying assumption is that when public diplomacy 
is detached from foreign policy, it “loses its commonsense meaning and 
becomes something else” (p. 298). Second, case studies dealing with the 
US’s public diplomacy with adversarial states ask, as the title of the book 
suggests, whether to “isolate or engage” with those states. Wiseman’s 
book reminds us that this fundamental question has been neglected for 
years in the field of public diplomacy. Third, the case studies contained in 
this work demonstrate the importance of the connections and activities 
of individuals and non-state actors, particularly in adversarial states, 
challenging long-established state-centric international relations theories 
and bringing people-to-people exchanges closer to the mainstream.
However, the book could certainly have been improved, on at least 
two fronts. First, most chapters do not go beyond episodic examples of 
public diplomacy, failing to study each country in a more systematic and 
analytical way. Second, although Wiseman rightly points out that the 
boundaries are blurry between public diplomacy and other transnational 
interactions (pp. 13, 292, 298), the book falls short of addressing “thorny 
conceptual questions such as who is a public diplomacy actor and what 
are public diplomacy’s boundaries” (p. 7). The almost interchangeable 
use of the terms soft power and public diplomacy in the case studies 
contributes to the work’s overall conceptual unclarity. Nevertheless, Isolate 
or Engage provides readers with significant insight into whether and how 
public diplomacy and people-to-people exchanges can contribute to 
improving ties between adversarial states.
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